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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
  This is the second time that William Houston has appealed evidentiary rulings 
following trial judgments in favor of the defendant Easton Area School District on 
Houston’s employment discrimination claim.  On the first appeal, we vacated and 
remanded the judgment because the presiding Magistrate Judge was overly restrictive in 
barring the introduction of evidence regarding potentially similarly situated individuals.  
On this appeal, Houston contends, among other things, that the Magistrate Judge made 
the opposite mistake and was overly permissive in allowing the defendant to introduce 
evidence of another set of comparators.  This time, we will affirm.
1
   
I. 
Houston, a former school district administrator who is African-American, 
contends that the Easton Area School District (“the District”) discriminated against him 
on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e et seq.  At the time of his retirement in 1998, Houston was a so-called “cabinet 
member” administrator.  Cabinet member was an informal title denoting a direct 
reporting line to the Superintendent.  Upon retirement, Houston received credit and 
payment for only 25% of his unused, accrued sick leave.  The following year, 1999, three 
other cabinet member administrators—all white—retired and received 100% of their 
accrued sick leave.  Houston contends that this different treatment was based on race.   
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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Prior to the initial trial, the District’s motion to exclude evidence relating to the 
retirement packages of three, white comparators (who were not covered by the same plan 
as Houston) and to exclude evidence of historically unequal pay for black employees 
within the District was granted.
2
  The case was reassigned to another Magistrate Judge, 
and Houston’s motion for reconsideration of the evidentiary rulings was denied.  After a 
one-day bench trial, the Magistrate Judge found in favor of the District.  Houston 
appealed, but only challenged the exclusion of the white comparators’ retirement 
information, not the exclusion of the historic unequal pay evidence.  We agreed that the 
evidence regarding the comparators was erroneously excluded because Act 93 status was 
not the only relevant factor, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the District Court.  
Houston v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 355 F. App’x 651 (3d Cir. 2009).     
On remand, the District moved in limine to exclude, once more, the evidence of 
historic unequal pay.  Over Houston’s objection, the Magistrate Judge granted the motion 
and excluded the evidence.  Consistent with our earlier opinion, the Magistrate Judge 
permitted Houston to introduce evidence relating to the retirements of white cabinet 
member comparators.  The Magistrate Judge also permitted the District to introduce 
evidence of other administrators who only received 25% of their accrued sick days, just 
                                              
2
 Specifically, evidence regarding the retirements of Messrs. Ciccarelli, Hettel, and 
Piazza was excluded because they were not covered by the District’s Act 93 
compensation plan, whereas Houston was covered.  In contrast, evidence regarding Mr. 
Wrazien’s retirement was permitted because he, like Houston, was an Act 93 employee.  
Act 93, 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 11-1164, requires school districts to adopt compensation plans 
for certain school administrators whose positions are not included in a bargaining unit.  
Superintendents, business managers, and personnel directors are specifically excluded 
from Act 93 coverage.   
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like Houston.  Houston argued that this evidence should not have come in because these 
other administrators were not cabinet members, in contrast to Houston and the three 
white cabinet members who received 100% of their sick leave.  Houston also requested a 
jury instruction specifically instructing the jury that the District was not limited under 
Pennsylvania state law to awarding Houston 25% of his accrued sick leave.  The District 
Court denied this request.   
At the conclusion of the second trial, this time a jury trial, the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the District.  Houston then filed a motion for a new trial, which was 
denied.  Houston appeals and requests a new trial.   
II. 
 We review a district court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion.  Walden v. 
Ga.-Pac. Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 517 (3d Cir. 1997).  The same standard also applies to a 
district court’s refusal to give a particular jury instruction, United States v. Khorozian, 
333 F.3d 498, 508 (3d Cir. 2003), and a district court’s decision to deny a motion for a 
new trial, Montgomery Cnty. v. Microvote Corp., 320 F.3d 440, 445 (3d Cir. 2003).   
III. 
 Houston first contends that it was error for the District Court to exclude evidence 
of historic inequality in pay between employees of different races.  Houston had every 
opportunity to challenge this evidentiary ruling on his first appeal, but failed to do so.  
Accordingly, the law-of-the-case doctrine dictates that this argument was waived.  See 
Cowgill v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 798, 802 n.2 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that a party 
waives a contention that could have been but was not raised on a prior appeal).   
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Even if this argument had not been waived, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by concluding that the probative value of the historic unequal pay evidence 
was outweighed by the potential for prejudice and confusion.  Although the evidence was 
arguably relevant to the issue of discriminatory intent, nowhere in his complaint did 
Houston assert a claim for ongoing pay discrimination.  Instead, he only asserted a claim 
for discrimination in retirement benefits.  Moreover, Houston’s counsel admitted at the 
final pretrial conference that the proffered historic pay evidence covered a period that 
was a long time ago.  Accordingly, the evidence risked confusing the jury and prejudicing 
the defendant with allegations tangentially related to the current dispute.  See Ansell v. 
Green Acres Contracting Co., Inc., 347 F.3d 515, 524 (3d Cir. 2003) (“There is a point at 
which a prior or subsequent act becomes so remote in time from the alleged 
discriminatory act at issue, that the former cannot, as a matter of law, be relevant to 
intent.”).3   
 Houston also contends that it was error for the District Court to permit the 
introduction of evidence that non-cabinet administrators also received only 25% of their 
accrued sick leave.  There was no abuse of discretion and the jury was entitled to 
consider whether these administrators were similarly situated to Houston, particularly 
given the evidence that the “cabinet member” distinction was an informal one.  Any 
alleged prejudice to Houston was also cured by his counsel’s extensive cross-examination 
of the witness called to testify on this issue.     
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 We also reject Houston’s contention that the District opened the door to the 
historic pay inequality evidence or that such evidence was admissible under a continuing 
violation theory.   
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 There is also no merit to Houston’s related argument that the jury should have 
been instructed that as a matter of state law the 25% credit was a minimum benefit, not a 
maximum benefit.  The District Court refrained from providing a specific charge to that 
effect because it did not believe that it was a settled matter of law, and because, in any 
event, the District Superintendent testified that she believed that she had authority to 
provide Houston with more than 25% credit.  Because the defense evidence itself 
indicated that there was discretion, there was no prejudice by not instructing that such 
discretion existed as a matter of law.   
 Houston’s right to a fair trial was preserved and his arguments on appeal are 
unavailing.   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
 
 
 
 
